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Miss not the occasion ; by the forelock take
That subtle power, the never-halting time,
Lest a mere moment's putting off should make
Mischance almost as heavy as a crime.

—*Wordsworth.*

If you trap the moment before it's ripe,
The tears of repentance you 'll certainly wipe ;
But if once you let the ripe moment go,
You can never wipe off the tears of woe.

—*Blake.*

Gather ye rose buds while ye may,
Old time is still a-flying,
And this same flower, that smiles to-day,
To-morrow will be dying.

—*Herrick.*

Jaina Logic

BY

Prof. A. Chakravarti M.A., L.T.

(Continued from page 57.)

NAYAS.

THE next topic relating to Jaina Logic is about *Nayas*. This is the second means of understanding things, the first being *Pramanas*. All concrete things are extremely complex; they have innumerable qualities and relations. The Reals being such complex entities they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension of a thing from a particular point of view is known as *Naya*—an opinion or an assertion from some one aspect. Every aspect of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence *Naya* is a means of insight into the nature of Reality. Theoretically the possible *Nayas* are infinite in number since the Reals have infinite qualities and relations. But writers on Jaina Logic generally speak of seven different Nayas. These are *Naigama*, *Sangraha*, *Vyavahara*, *Rijusutra*, *Sabda*, *Samabhirudha* and *Evambhuta*. Let us try to explain these in order.

I NAIGAMA NAYA. This Naya seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the scholars. Pujyapada in his Commentary on Sutra 33 of Book I of Tattvartha Sutra explains the Naya thus: Naigama is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of activity. The illustrations given are,

i. You see a person carrying water, fire-wood and other necessaries for cooking meals and ask him "What are you doing?" "I am cooking meals" he replies. This answer refers to the purpose or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act of cooking at the time of the answer.

ii. The second illustration refers to a person who goes with an axe when he is asked what he is about he replies, "I am to bring a wooden measure (*Prastha*)." He is to cut a piece of bamboo perhaps and make a *prastha* out of it. Here again the measure is only the purpose or end to be realised.

In each of the two examples *Odava* and *Prastha*—food and measure there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course of conduct of some duration. The course of conduct is

represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In spite of this difference the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general purpose or aim may be said to be present in all the different stages of this course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives meaning to the different items of the series and connects them into a whole. This emphasis on the teleological element which is immanent in a course of purposive activity seems to be Naigama Naya point of view.

The same interpretation with the same two illustrations of 'cooking" and 'making a measure, is adopted by Srutasagara, the author of a *Vrithi* on Tattvartha called after him *Srutasagaraoyam*. The same illustrations are again found in *Prameya-Kamala-Martanda* a treatise on Logic.

This Naigama Naya is further subdivided into three according to the time-relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The two illustrations refer to some present course. Hence they come under 1. *Vardhamana Naigama*. But then we may be looking back to a past event. On the morning of Deepavali Day you may say, "To-day is the *Pari-Nirvana Kala* of Lord Mahavira." But Lord Mahavira does not attain Nirvana on that day which you are actually speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it was on a corresponding day on that year. Because of this correspondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years. Thus we speak of the King's Birth-day, the Darbar day every year. The assertion has meaning only because of a past event. This characteristic attribute of the present though genuinely belonging to the past, yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation between the two, is pertaining to 2. *Bhuta Naigama* (past Naigama).

Instead of looking back to the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting in the concrete present some elements which was once associated with it you may discover in it something which is *yet to be*. At the sight of prince you may hail. "Here comes H.R.H." The prince is but scion of the royal family. He is not yet king but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every *Bhavya Jiva*, a good soul, as Siddha Jiva a Perfect Soul. For somehow in the far off future Perfection will

be the goal of all; for everyone is good in the germ. Such an assertion is true according to *Bhavi Naigama*—future Naigama.

The other way of interpreting this Naigama Naya is associated with Siddhasena who is quoted by Hermann Jacobi in his translation of the *Sutra* 33 (referred to above) of Sri Umasvati's Tattvartha. Sri Deva Suri who is quoted by Mallishena in his *Syadvada Mangeri* also adopts this second view. But curiously this is not so very prominent in Umasvati's own Bhashya. Anyhow this method of interpreting the Naya starts with the examination of the relations between the universal and the particular—*Samanya* and *Visesha*. Further *Nyaya* and *Vaiseshika* systems are referred to as adopting this Naigama Naya in an *ekanta* manner, (i.e.) These two systems adopt this Naya so far as they to but push it to an unwarrented length. Sankhya and Vedanta deny altogether *Viseshas*—particulars. Buddhism denies *Samanya* universal outright. Against these two extremes the above systems recognise the importance of both. The Universal by itself or the particular by itself will not be able to account for a concrete thing, These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of both Samanya and Visesha, univeral and particular. There can be no (Samanya) universal apart from the particular and no particular (Visesha) apart from the universal and there can be no real thing apart from either. This seems to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real.

The very same view is said to be adopted by the Nyayikas and the Viseshikas. Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the Naigama point of view. But wherein do the Jainas differ from the others? It is here. No doubt Nyayikas and Viseshikas adopt the Naigama view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the universal and the particular (Samanya and Visesha). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable. No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative. So far they agree with the Jainas. But while the Jainas believe that the distinction between Samanya-universal and Visesha-particular is true only in a relative way. The Nyayikas and the Viseshikas maintain that it is absolutely true. Samanya is quite different and distinct from Visesha. It is because of this absolute difference

between the two that in their hands the Naya becomes *Naigama-bhasa*. They are *Kathanchit bumiah* and not *Atyanta bumiah.*

After explaining thus the Naigama Naya Sri Deva Suri enumerates three species of this Naigama distinction.

1. Differentiating two qualities one from the other e.g. Existence and Thought are in the Soul.

"*Sat chaitanyam atmani.* Here thought is differentiated from existence.

2. Differentiating two substances e.g. Dravya is that which manifests through things and there modes.

"*Vastu paryâvah Dravyam.*"

3. Differentiating a thing from its attribute e.g. A sensual person has only a momentary pleasure.

"*Kshanamekam Sukhi Vishayasaktajiva.*"

Thus 1. Existence is spoken to be separate from thought. 2. A thing from its mode and 3. A person as different from his pleasure. Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way. As we said above the very same illustrations are reproduced by H. Jacobi in his translation.

But when we attend to Mallishena we find evidently both the interpretations given in his "Syadvada Manjeri." He begins by explaining Naigama Naya in the same way as Deva Suri or Siddasena does. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book where there is a discussion of the relation between Samanya and Visesha. Hence he does not want to add anything further under this Naya and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in *Pravachana*—the Divine Word. What are the two examples? He just mentions two names; and they appear to be cryptic. But we need not be altogether helpless. His words are "Pravana prasiddha *Nilayana Prastha* drishtanthadava etc." Nilayana and Prastha are the words here. In Pujyapada we have *Odana* and *Prastha*. Instead of food and a measure we have a *house* and a measure. The rest is quite clear. The illustrations leave us in no doubt as to the meaning of the Naya. House building or making a measure refers to the purpose or the ideal. It relates to "*Sankalpamatra*" as Pujyapada says.

The next question we have to face is "How does Mallishena manage to give one explanation and to bring in the illustrations

pertaining to the other interpretations?" Here we must confess we are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is quoting the examples. It may refer to an author from whom both Pujyapada and Mallishena draw their inspiration. What justification is there for Mallishena's attempt to bring the two views together? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to be the common basis for both the views. In the case of house-building or measure-constructing the thing which is to be the goal is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisation of the same. Similarly the distinction between the universal and the particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one point of view may be universal from another. In fact the particular is drawn out of the universal. It is through the medium of the particular that the universal expresses its nature. If you remember this point then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent have this common foundation. Perhaps Mallishena had this in his mind when he interpreted the Naya in one way and illustrated it in the other way. This compromise is offered as a provisional suggestion.

II. Sangraha Naya. The next Naya is the class point of view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina System is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of individuals. These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we consider them as individuals belonging to a class our attention is directed to the underlying similarity to the exclusion of their individual and proper characteristics. From this underlying principle of classification we may consider the individuals as a whole and a Unity. Here again the unity is only relatively true. The unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number of individuals brought under the same class. But there is a great danger in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view. The individuals forming the class though spoken of as a whole and unitary class are really distinct from one another and may be really differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals of Space and Time. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the Plurality and difference would be a

distinct metaphysical error. It is this erroneous application of Sangraha Naya that accounts for the system of Advaita Vedanta. Too much emphasis on the unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of Hegelian Idealism. Both agree in condemning the differences as appearances and *Maya* and in accepting the Ultimate Absolute as the one Reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as the danger of this Sangraha Naya. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the Reality is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered the Naya has its own uses. But in the hands of the Sankhyas and Mimamsikas it becomes absolute and thus a *Nayabhasa*.

This Sangraha Naya is of two kinds, *Para-Sangraha* or the ultimate class view and *Apara-Sangraha* or the inferior class view. Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may speak of all things as one in the ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things living and non-living included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is *Apara-Sangraha* or the inferior class view.

III. Vyavahara Naya. Vyavahara Naya means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the Charvakas and Barhaspatyas. The whole criterion of Reality the concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only Pramana of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and peeping into the future through ideal forecast are philosophical uncertainties. The same applies to the categories obtained by Intellectual analysis such as *Samaanya* and *Visesha*—universal and particular. Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or

a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the Pramanas and sanctioned by Vyavahara or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either Samanya or Visesha! Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical questions? The Concrete Reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so for theoretically true.

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the pathway, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearances or illusions of *Maya*. Their Reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true. But to go beyond, to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present, to deny the past and the future and to reject the philosophical categories *in toto* is to surrender Reason to sense-perception, is the apotheosis of convention. Hence Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this Vyavahara Naya though it recognises in it the soul of goodness and an element of partial truth.

IV. Rijusutra Naya: This Rijusutra Naya is the extreme opposite of the Sangraha Naya. The latter denies all difference whereas Rijusutra all continuity and identity. Reality is concentrated to mathematical present. It is purely momentary. In this respect it is still narrower than the Vyavaharic present. At least for Vyavahara view there is a tolerable duration for the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this Rijusutra Naya a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment. The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet. Hence to speak of a thing as being in the *no-more* or the *not-yet* is sheer contradiction. If it is a real at all it must be in the present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this Rijusutra view and Buddhistic metaphysics. Its aim is as that of Buddhism to expose the pretentions of an unchanging metaphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to this conception of this changeless substratum, Buddhistic metaphysics adopts Rijusutra view and brings the centre of

gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time-duration. It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To over-emphasise the neglected element of change as a set-off against Vedanta and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to attempt to identify Reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only Real and to make it live in a metaphysical void is to overshoot one's mark. It is this erroneous and uncalled for accent on change to the detriment of the relating and unifying principle of Reality without which change will have no meaning. It is this Rijusutrabhasa that the Jaina System asks us to beware of. If this principle is the soul criterion of Reality, the Reality would end itself by committing suicide to employ a suggestive phrase of Bradley's.

V. Sabda Naya or the implication of terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and an action may be referred to by appropriate words in the language. Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. A particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech Thus the difference in meaning corresponds to the difference among the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term and its meaning. Variation in the term may introduce a corresponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the difference of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of speech may be said to have corresponding variations however slight they be. This principle of correspondence between the terms and their meanings is the foundation of the science of Grammar. We have already mentioned that there is a relation to Logic implicitly present in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discussion of verbal implications very often pass beyond their legitimate sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such an exaggerated notion about the verbal implication would be not only illogical but also conflict-

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ing with common sense and convention. Jain Logicians therefore raise a note of warning against such an unwarranted application of this principle and point out the logical danger in that one sided emphasis of the relation between *Sabda* and *Artha*.

Their contention is this. No doubt generally speaking the grammatical principle or Sabda Naya adopted by the Vyakarnis is sanctioned by usage. But to assume it to be an universal principle without an exception would be neglecting the difference between the relative and the absolute and identifying the partial truth with the whole and the complete one. Ordinarily each name has its own meaning. The term 'crow' is different from 'king' not merely in word but also in meaning. But this is also true. Words which are different in nature and origin may nevertheless refer to the same identical object.

Exaggerated and universal application of the Sabda Naya of the grammarians cannot conveniently accomodate synonyms in the vocabulary. That they are synonyms and that they are distinct from one another literally no grammarian can afford to deny. Yet unswerving loyalty to this principle of Sabda Naya would constrain him to accept such an absurdity. The only way out of the difficulty is to accept the Jaina interpretation of Sabda Naya according to which the relation between terms and meanings is a relative principle. The illustrations generally offered are the synonyms Indra, Sakra, and Purandara names referring to the one and the same individual the Lord of the Devas. Similarly terms differing not merely in origin as the above but also in number, gender, person, case etc., may still refer to the same individual. Thus Pushyah (Masculine) Tara (feminine) Nakshatram (Neuter) in spite of difference of gender do refer to the same object,—star. Again in a sentence terms referring to the same individual object may appear in different cases; and if a verb, in different tense and person may refer to the same activity. This subordination of grammatical differences of inflexion to the logical implication of terms seems to be the essential principle of Sabda Naya as understood by the Jainas. It is not necessary to repeat that the Naya in the hands of the grammarians because of Ekanta application degenerates into a false Naya (Sabdhabhasa.)

VI. SAMABHIRUDHA NAYA—the derivative difference of names. This Samabhirudha Naya is the defferentiation of terms

according to their roots. Thus it is only a special application of Sabda Naya. In becoming a special it becomes narrow and more exaggerated than the above Naya. As a general rule the terms in a language have their own special radical signification. This radical signification is the reason for the particular nomenclature. The first appearance of the word was evidently suggested by such an application of the root. Of course this does not mean the connotation of the name. The connotation is the ground of the application of the name whereas the significance of the root accounts for the origin of the name. The former is logical and universal whereas the latter may be purely subjective and even accidental. The Science of history of language may discover various principles subserving the origin of names in a vocabulary. To the historian of language this is certainly an important principle. To detect radical difference in the vocabulary and to trace the history of different terms from this original seed-difference is certainly a commendable pursuit. But this nucleus difference interesting to the historian of the language is not so very important as to swallow up all the other grammatical and logical principles of implication. Here again the Naya is discovered to be a relative one by Jaina Logic which enjoins a necessary circumspection to the above claims put forward by the historian of the language. For example it is true that the term '*go*' (cow) is different from Indra. This difference can be traced to their respective roots. Hence the difference in the roots must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings. Accurately speaking, says this Naya, the terms Indra, Sakra, and Purandara respectively imply the all-prosperous, the all-powerful and the destroyer of enemies. These are the direct and legitimate signification sanctioned by their origin. To emphasise the original and the radical implication of a term is one thing and to suggest that the term in its ordinary application must necessarily and always mean the same original radical sense is quite a different thing. The passage from the radical and immediate difference to the current application and the general accepted sense is an unwarranted jump taken by this Naya.

VII. Evambhuta Naya. The last of the Nayas is further specialisation of the previous one. This is merely the historical principle run mad. According to this principle the radical sense in

general is not the appropriate implication of a term. Even the root significance must have different gradations and aspects. Of these various aspects and gradations in the manifestation of the thing only one particular aspect is contemplated by the root of a term and it is this contemplated aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the term in its current usage. The very same thing in a different attitude must be designated by a different term altogether. Thus for example the term '*go*' implies an animal emotion. That which moves is a '*go*' or cow. The same term therefore should not be applied when the animal is at rest or lying down. Movement is fundamentally different from lying down and therefore the same term 'cow' should not be applied to an animal at two such fundamentally different attitudes. Fundamental difference in the logical implication must necessarily be indicated by literal difference in the terms. This is the contention of *Evambhuta Naya*. The term must just designate the particular aspect or attitude in the object referred to. If the term goes beyond that it will be a source of confusion and ambiguity. Language instead of revealing things as they are would only conceal them.

This grammatico-logical contention may be conceded partially. In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle but the language that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous logical principle. Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify what actually exists with what ought to be logically. Therefore this Evambhuta Naya interpreted without reference to concrete usage and conventional meaning would only end in meaningless verbiage.

These are the seven Nayas referred to in Jaina Logic. The first four are called *Artha* Nayas in as much as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other three are called *Sabda* Nayas in as much as they pertain to terms and their meanings. The same seven are sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under Dravya Naya whereas the other four come under Paryaya Naya. The former means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of change or manifestation.

These Nayas have an important place in the Anekanta Vada of the Jaina System. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed in as much as they issue forth from

the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every day speech but also in the language of the metaphysical statements have their own context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the back-ground would result in practical inconvenience and philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the Anekanta aspect. Multifaced reality may lead to multitude of descriptions. Every one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit him with his own petty frame-work then there is ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System building in philosophy has always been in the process of providing reality with a Procrustean bed. But one who knows smiles at the simplicity of human philosophising. The critical caution that there are more beings in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy was sounded several centuries before the Christian era by the Anekanta Vadins.

(To be continued.)

"The Heart of Jainism."

(A Review)

BY

J. L. Jaini.

(Continued from page 84.)

P. 248. The Christian Faith, Hope and Love.—No one can contend that the Three Jewels of Jainism are same as Faith, Hope and Love. And there is absolutely no need that they should be. The Jaina Trai-ratna means one thing. The Christian three do not mean the same thing. But it may be noted that all the 3 Christian ideas are most fully found in Jainism, but shorn of their merely technical meaning.

Take Faith,—The Jaina Sraddha or Samyaka-darsana is faith in Truth. You may call Truth, Christ, Krisna, Rama, "a Supreme

Deity," Jehovah, Science, whatever you like. But full, firm, unwavering faith or belief remains the same. And then as has been shown above the Jainas have faith in a perfect, ideal soul, a supreme Deity, i.e., the Siddha.

Hope.—It is false to say that "Hope to the Jaina is almost a meaningless word." Depression is entirely alien to the Jaina creed. It is the most optimistic, courageous and contented creed. The worst karma is the Deluding or Mohaniya. Soka and Bhaya, Sorrow and Fear, are two of its sub-classes. If you have neither sorrow nor fear, what do you have but bright hope, cheerfulness and courage. But the owl hides himself in a noon-day forest and may deny the midday sun.

I can go further. Dante's "God's will is our peace" is not alien to Jainism. True peace comes only with a combined faith-knowledge-and-life in God, as I have said above (Tattvartha Sutra 1. 1). I am familiar with the attitude of denial of the author. It is common to all narrow-minded followers of any creed. The Jainas are not free from it. Christ's Sermon on the Mount with its lovely teaching of Ahimsa, Forgiveness and Straightforwardness, is rank heresy in the eyes of most of them. Why? Because it comes from Christ. Put it in Hindi in an old commentary and every Jaina would rave about it as a glorious exposition of eternal Truth. Our Love of Truth is shallow and nominal. We do not follow it as such, And we cannot make it out, if our narrow shibboleths are not there. We identify not the one, Glorious Truth; but merely the shifting vestments of it, i.e., our transient "little systems." It is one of the greatest glories of Jainism that (1) it teaches the eternal sameness of Truth, and (2) it holds even the Tirthankaras to come and go and still the Truth lasts for ever, infinitely before and infinitely after any Tirthankara.

Love.—this "most clearly distinguishes the Christian from the Jaina ideal." I fear the writer does not understand Jainism at all, and if I could say without presumption and impertinence, she understands little of the spirit of Christ also. Love of the ideal (call it Christ, if you like) is a paramount duty of all Jainas. Also their noble, spotless and perfect doctrines of non-injury (ahimsa) and compassion (Daya) certainly include all that can be connoted by Love in Christian spirituality or its manifestation in the earthly career of a good and ideal Christian.

The Jainas have already got what Christ gave as his teachings. But the Mammon and Mars-mad lip-followers of Chrst need to understand and follow the noble doctrines of ahimsa and daya. Some of the best do follow the spirit of these doctrines, but they are only exceptions which accentuate the rule.

P. 289. Chapter XVI The Empty Heart of Jainism.
This is the crown of thorns, born of prejudice and nurtured by bitterness. This is the aim with which the writer spent seven vain years in the study of Jainism. Every page is chaos.

Goethe and Emerson found in Rome, what they brought into it. Mrs. Stevenson finds emptiness of heart in Jainism. What did she bring to it?

At p. xi of the book ll. 4-3 from bottom of the page we read. "Yet of all these ancient Orders one only has survived in India down to the present day." The question is obvious: How long does an empty heart live? The age of Jainism shows its vitality.

The title of this Chapter is question begging, and it condemns the aim of writing the book as unworthy and its conclusions as unacceptable as the judgment of a *judex qui litem suam facet.*

Jainism is the Religion of Ruth *par excellence.* It is the Science of Sacrifice, Wisdom and Life. It is full of the sun of Truth, if only one has the eyes of the soul open to see it.

Alas! in the pure, mirror-like heart of Jainism, the author sees the image of her own heart.

Why should her heart hunger for Forgiveness? Why load it with sin that Forgiveness should be needed? If the anthor is not misrepresenting Christianity, the position is this. Christianity says: "You have the original sin, you cannot help sinning. Go, sin. But have Faith. Christ died for you. The saints accumulated superfluous merit for you. Ask for Grace. Your sins will be forgiven and you will be saved."

Is it not simpler, better and more scientific for Jainism to say "You have karmas, you can help sinning. Go. Sin no more You will be saved. If you do sin as a frail human being, see your folly and weakness. Be sure that you will bear the fruit thereof. Repent. The Kingdom of Karma is in you. It is impartial. You cannot flatter it, cheat it, cajole it or buy it. Knowing this im-

partiality, and being desirous of freedom, self-realisation and Bliss, you will find it impossible to sin. Go. Know and sin no more."

"Jainas know of no Guide."—Surely the author knows that the well-known Jaina term "Tirthankara" means a guide. There are numberless such Guides, 24 for the current aeon (Avasarpini). Is it true to say, then, that the Jainas have no Guide?

"Personal friendship of God and man."—This anthropomorphic vague intercourse does not appeal to the Jainas. The ordinary conception of God in the mind of an average Christian seems to be of an earthly father and protector &c. Their whole soul is in mundane life, in their fashionable clothes, in their daily bread &c. From what little I have read of Christ's life and teachings with all admiration and reverence, I fear this material, mundane conception of God and Christ misses the Kernel of Truth.

"The ideal needed is the development, not the negation of personality"—This is quite true. But the author wrongly implies that Jainism negates personality. Poor Jainism! when it teaches *ad nauseum* that the personality of each individual soul persists even in Moksa or Liberation! Is it useful or edifying to seek or compare Truth in this way? Or does the author mean by "modern" "personality" more clothes, more food, more tea parties, more theatres, more Tango-dances, more luxurious and well-paid missions, and more nepotism and struggle for existence in the jobs even of Church service?

The Jaina ideal is to evolve the utmost powers of the soul. See Outlines of Jainism pp. xxi, xxii, 1, 2, 3.

P. 290. "Modern Science and Jainism—Jainism has nothing to fear from Science. Modern Jainas, like modern Indians, are not in the van of Science. But they are not quite ignorant of Science and its methods. Fifty years ago, "critics" scoffed at Indians and Jainas for (1) inordinately long periods of times in their Puranas and sacred books; (2) their belief in feeling &c., in sub-human beings; (3) their belief in a long, long history of India and its own Indian Emperors and the glories and peace and prosperity of their Empires. What has Science done? Disproved all this? Certainly not. The Science of Geology and Astronomy corroborated the long

periods of Indian tradition; but it disproved the creation of the world in 4002 B.C.—Science again, has shown possession of mind and feelings in the lower animals, in plants also. The *Vanaspati* (vegetable) souls of Jainism are described as possessing life from at least 3000 years ago. Science may yet *prove* life in certain conditions of minerals.—Once again Science is every-day pushing back the secular history of India, unearthing the past-glories of many a civilized Empire, the very fact of which lies unread in the oblivious bosom of the Past. I for one am not afraid of Science knowing Jainism. I fear rather that the custodians of Jaina truth will keep it from Science and thus delay the progress of Science and Happiness of Humanity!

The Jaina magistrate, if any, who said: "I call Jainism a dummy religion," must have been as learned in Jainism as the author of the *Heart of Jainism*. The Jaina society of to-day may be dummy. But *Jainism* most certainly not. The Jainism as given by the Tirthankaras is eternal and eternally true. I speak from my own very little knowledge. If more knowledge brings more light, I shall have more Truth from any source.

Over against Mrs. Stevenson's magistrate, I can set an Oxford friend of mine, a brilliant student, the son of a clergyman, who often told me: "I wish Christianity had a better account to give of itself." I myself know the hollow and soulless way in which many, (but not all) Sunday-Church going folk in England doze, or do un-Christian things. But it is folly to conclude from this that Christianity is bad or lifelesss, or that all the evils of nominally Christian peoples are the results of Christianity. It should be terrible to apply this standard. This Great War is obviously the work of Satan, and how can we lay its deliberate horrors planned and executed by Christians at the door of Christianity?

"An older Jaina" who was afraid of the awful doom that awaited him. He was full of fear. That is Delusion. His talk also could not be but depressed. Certainly the fear of this old man was not due to Jainism, as any careful reader of this Review would see.—Why should the Redeemer offer "riches of His Grace" "to women" "freely" and specially? Are they specially "sinful and fallen, weak and helpless." Jaina books give a very high place to women. But as a sex, they give them a lower position than that of men. Was Christ aware of this?

The Jaina Student was without "grace." I hope he would be a better non-Jaina than he turned out to be a Jaina.

P. 291 Certainly sorrow is a dark and deluding passion. But sympathy, sufferings, sacrifice is noble. The Jaina's compassion (Daya) is well-known. Their 22 sufferings to be borne nobly are familiar to all. Their great vows of renunciation are monuments of deliberate sacrifices of the material and fleeting, for the acquisition of the spiritual and everlasting.

Suffering is never "shirked" in Jainism. We have 22 sufferings and many others.

(To be continued.)

Ayodhya.

THE first Tirthankara, Shri Rishabha Deva, was born at Ayodhya, now a small town, situate in the District of Fysabad, in the Province of Oudh, and a great stronghold of Brahmanism. It is full of temples and Dharmshalas, dedicated to Rama, Shri-Ram Chandra Swami, whom the Hindus worship as an incarnation of Vishnu. Although an important place of pilgrimage to the Jainas, there is no Jaina population there. The Jainas possess only a small temple, and a small Dharmshala, situated in no prominent place, which is looked after by an old Brahman resident of the locality, and is under the supervision of the Oudh Jain Provincial Sabha.

The enormous influence of the Brahmanas there has been of no avail in stopping the wilful slaughter of cows there by Musalmans on the day of the Id and the daily slaughter of goats &c., every day. An opposition by the Hindus, some years ago, led to serious rioting and violence, as a result of which many leading Hindu residents of the place were prosecuted in a long drawn trial and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. They, however, always opposed the Jaina procession, and it was for the first time on the 13th March last that the Jainas were allowed to carry their Sacred image in procession through the principal thoroughfares of Ayodhia, Oudh does not possess a large Jaina population; there was however a gathering of about 400 followers of the true faith. Brahmchari Jnananandjee delivered religious discourses morning and evening. A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Oudh Jain Prantik Sabha was held at night.

A General Meeting of the Sabha was held next day, under the Presidentship of Mr. J. L. Jaini, M.A., Bar-at-law. Resolutions expressive of joy on the successful termination of the war, gratefulness for the Royal Proclamation, the Constitutional Reforms, and heartily welcoming the visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and thanking the Muslim Community for stopping the slaughter of cows, were passed. A Committee for the proper management of places of pilgrimage in Oudh, was formed; and a deputation was arranged to wait upon the manager of the Balrampur Estate for restoration and preservation of the ancient pilgrimage of Shravasti, the birth-place of the 3rd Tirthankara. A Committee was also formed to take such steps as may be proper for stopping the slaughter of goats at the temples of Kausambi and Durga Devi in the Unao District on the last day of the month of Chaitra.

A public meeting was held at 3-30 p.m., which was presided over by Mr. G. M. Harper, M.A., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Mr. J. L. Jaini having accorded a hearty welcome to Mr. Harper, the proceedings were opened by inaugural verses recited by Mr. Ajit Prasada. Brahmchari Jnananandjee spoke in Hindi, and Mr. C. R. Jain, Bar-at-law in English on Jain Philosophy, distinguishing it from other systems of thought and Doctrine, and explaining the seemingly inexplicable and apparently untenable positions taken by various other religions. His learned, sublime , and yet clear and closely reasoned out discourse was listened to with close attention by the President, two Reverend Gentlemen of the Christian Church, Hindus and Mahomedans who graced the meeting with their presence. The Presidential remarks were appreciative and encouraging.

At night arrangements were made for taking accounts from the Brahman manager of the local temple and rest-house, and for the building of a rest house at Ratnapuri, the birth-place of Dharmanatha the 15th Tirthankara.

Ajit Prasada.

Notes and News.

THE Eleventh Anniversary of the Punjab S. S. Jain Sabha held at Lahore on 3rd and 4th April 1920 under the President-

ship of L. Kashi Shah Reis and Municipal Commissioner of Jammun. A large number of leading Jains of the Punjab attended.

On the 3rd the foundation stone of Shri Amar Jain Hostel was laid by the Honorable Mr. Maynard Vice Chancellor of the Punjab Univertity with great success.

About Rs. 11,000 were subscribed for the building.

The following resolutions were passed unanimously.

1. That the Punjab S.S. Jain Conference in its eleventh anniversary held at Lahore, on behalf of the Punjab Jain Community, expresses its steadfast loyalty and devotion to His Majesty, the King Emperor, and offers its heartiest thanks to the Government by the sympathetic assistance of whose officers, it has been able to lay successfully the foundation stone of "Shri Amar Jain Hostel," at Lahore.

2. That this Conference expresses its heartfelt joy, on the approaching visit of His Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales, to this Country, in winter next, to inaugurate the working of the Reforms Scheme, and to manifest His great personal interest in the progress of India; and that the Conference offers its sincere welcome to His Royal Highness.

3. That this Conference heartily thanks His Majesty, the King Emperor, and the Rt. Hon'ble the Secretary of State, for their wise and liberal policy in appointing the Hon'ble R.B. Shadi Lal, a talented member of the Aggarwal Community to the exalted position of the Chief Judge of the Lahore High Court, and congratulate His Honour, Sir Edward Maclagan for it.

4. That this Conference expresses its deep sense of pleasure at the appointment, and begs to convey its heartiest congratulations to the Hon'ble R. B. L. Shadi Lal for his elevation to the responsible and high post which, for the first time, has been conferred upon an Indian.

5. That this Conference respectfully but emphatically requests the Government, that having regard to the importance of the mercantile Punjab Jain Community, and to safeguard its commercial and communal welfare, it is most essential that, at least, two seats should be reserved for the members of the Jain Community, to be filled up by election or nomination, in the enlarged Provincial Legislative Council; and begs to submit that the attention of the Committee appointed for the preparation of rules

and regulations for the working of the Reforms Act, may be invited to it.

6. That this Conference humbly requests His Excellency, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, that having regard to the commercial importance of "The Premier Mercantile Jain Community" of India, it is essential that two seats should be set apart for the Jain Community, on the Indian Legislative Assembly; and urges upon His Excellency to divert the attention of the Reforms Commissioner, thereto.

7. That this Conference, in view of the fact, that it is most inconvenient for the Jains, on account of their religious obligations, to attend Schools, Colleges, Offices and Courts, on the birthday of Lord Mahavira (Chaitra Sudi 13), is forced to press upon the Government the desirability of having that day to be very kindly declared as a public holiday.

8. That this Conference respectfully urges upon the Government the necessity of appointing, at least, one Jain member, in every District and Municipal Board, in the Province.

9. That this Conference begs the Government that special and favourable attention should be paid to the deserving Jain young men in appointments to the public service.

10. That this Conference invites the attention of the University Authorities, for the introduction of Jain philosophy as one of the subjects in the Higher Examinations, and that a Sub-Committee consisting of the following gentlemen be appointed to make proper representation and to settle the details.

(i). R. B Diwan Bishan Das, Revenue Minister (Kashmere).
(ii). R. S. Moti Sagar B.A., L.L.B., Vakil.
(iii). L. Kanwar Sain M.A., Principal Law College.
(iv). L. Parma Nand B.A., Vakil.
(v). Prpf. Banarai Dass M.A.

11. That this Conference expresses its satisfaction that, in the previous years, at the representation of the Punjab Jain Sabha, five Jain Students were admitted every year, to the various classes of the Central Training College, for which the Jain Community of the Punjab feel indebted to the authorities; but coming to know that only one student has been taken this year, it strongly requests the authorities to kindly stick to the precedence and admit, at least, 5 Jain Students, annually.

12. That this Conference, in view of the admittedly backward condition of the Jain Community, as regards education, requests the Government, to afford special facilities to encourage education among the Jains.

13. That this Conference is of opinion that; in order to ascertain the true position of the Jain Community, it is essential that the Jains should distinctly be shown separately in each table and that the Census Department may kindly be instructed accordingly.

* * *

Amongst the many efforts made to reform the educational system of the country and to bring it on a line with the ideals of the East, one of the most note-worthy is the Brahmacharya Vidyalaya, established by the Hon'ble Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandi of Kasimbazar. The school is located at Ranchi, the summer station of the Bihar Orissa Government, in the house of the Maharaja Bahadur, with spacious garden attached to it. The central figure in the school is its Principal, Swami Yogananda Giri, B.A., who has relinquished the world in the cause of education. Two other graduates have followed him, Swami Dhirananda Giri, M.A., and Swami Satyanand Giri B.A. This sort of sanyasa by graduates for active service in the cause of eduation is in itself a noble example.

Particularly valuable, however, is the psychological study of the students' temperament, introduced by Swami Yogananda Giri. He divides the boy's general nature into Satva, Satva Rajas, Satva Tamas, Rajas, Rajas Tamas and Tamas. Then for the particular study of the boy, be wants information under the following heads :—

(1) General Information
(2) Constitutional Information
(3) Psycho-Physiological Information
(4) Attention
(5) Memory and Imitation
(6) Reason
(7) Imagination
(8) A letter written by the boy
(9) Obedience

* * *

Item No. 13 under the head of general information is:—

"What sort of punishment the boy was subjected to for offence (if it were necessary at all), as chiding, putting to shame, boycotting, beating (frequent or occasional), threatening, refusing to give dear objects, wounding feelings, and the effeet of it—short-lasting or enduring."

To quote the details of one head only by way of illustration.

"Reason."

1.—Grasping faculty—
   (1) Power of observation
   (2) „ discrimination
2. Power of assimilation
   Slow—Quick—
3. Power of inference—(this being a sign of cleverness)
4. Assimilation of particular objects—
   (1) Through interest
   (2) Through Previous knowledge
   Causes of slow assimilation,
   (3) Congenital
   (4) Want of interest.
5. Power of comparison
6. Power of generalisation
7. Reason applied towards different subjects or lines—
)1) Planning
   (2) Mathematics (numbers and figures)
   (3) In getting up theories
   (4) Common sense (working out practical things or suggesting practical course.)

* * *

The following quotation will give a fair idea of the working of the school:—

"The faculties of the students are left free to grow—but restraint is put and regulations are enforced whenever necessary, the principle being restraint *in* freedom not restraint *of* freedom. Individual attention is paid to students. They are placed under the direct care of the Acharyas and Adhyapakas. Three departments, *viz.*, Brahmachari Vibhaga and Shishu Vibhaga, have been opened. Those studenss who are naturally quiet, obedient and possess good *Samskaras* come under the Brahmachari Vibhaga;

those who are comparatively restless and fidgety belong to the Satsanga Vibhaga. The young children are put into the Shishu Vibhaga, where their latent capacities are left free to grow without much positive or obtrusive instruction from outside." The Maharaja of Kashimbazar is to be congratulated upon his encouragement of this Scheme of education.

* * *

May we not expect a few graduate Sanyasins in the cause of Jainism. The time has come when Sanyas for a limited period—say for five years—prior to a householder's life may be taken up. Temporary Bhikshuship is not unknown in Buddhism. Vanaprastha and Sanyasa at the end of the house-holder's life are now things of the past and may not suit modern conditions. But a temporary Sanyasa after Brahmacharya or College life may be a potent factor in the revival of old ideals and their adaptation to modern conditions. We want youthful and trained to spread the ideals.

The Hony. General Secretary of the Punjab Jain Sabha writes:—

"L. Nathu Mal J. President of the Punjab Jain Sabha on the occasion of the Marriage of his Son L. Amrao Singh gave Rs. 500 to different religions intitutions as detailed below.

	Rs.	A.	P.
Jamun Temples	111	0	0
Orphanage Delhi	11	0	0
Kanya Pathshala Ludhiana	17	0	0
Jiv Daya Gan Shala Jamun	21	0	0
Tract Society Sialkot	11	0	0
Jain Boarding House	201	0	0
Jain Sabha Punjab	51	0	0
Jain Sabha Jamun	51	0	0
Jain Gazette Madras	5	0	0
Jain Pardip	5	0	0
Jain Daya Gian Parsarak Bombay	5	0	0
Jain Samadh Jammun	11	0	0
	500	0	0